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Abstract
We present a case study of hierarchical Bayesian explanatory cognitive psy-
chometrics, examining information processing characteristics of individuals
with high-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder (HFASD). On the basis
of previously published data, we compare the classification behavior of a
group of children with HFASD with that of typically developing (TD) con-
trols using a computational model of categorization. The parameters in the
model reflect characteristics of information processing that are theoretically
related to HFASD. Because we expect individual differences in the model’s
parameters, as well as differences between HFASD and TD children, we use
a hierarchical explanatory approach. A first analysis suggests that children
with HFASD are less sensitive to the prototype. A second analysis, involving
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a mixture component, reveals that the computational model is not appro-
priate for a subgroup of participants, which implies parameter estimates are
not informative for these children. Focusing only on the children for whom
the prototype model is appropriate, no meaningful difference in sensitivity
between HFASD and TD children is inferred.
Keywords:
1. Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterized by difficulties with re-
ciprocal social interaction, abnormalities in communication, non-functional,
restricted interests, and repetitive and stereotyped behaviors (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013). While the socio-communicational symptoms are
salient in everyday functioning, it has been suggested that cognitive char-
acteristics play a key role in the aetiology of the phenotype of ASD (?).
Of particular interest are the difficulties that individuals with ASD experi-
ence when transferring knowledge from familiar to novel situations. Several
leading theories (Happe´ & Frith, 2006; Mottron et al., 2006; Plaisted, 2001;
?) propose that individuals with ASD have enhanced perceptual discrim-
ination abilities and form hyperspecific representations that are extremely
detailed and focused on differentiating objects. Hyperspecific representation
are thought to impede abstraction of more general knowledge and general-
ization to novel contexts, events or objects (Bott et al., 2006; Happe´ & Frith,
2006).
Church et al. (2010) examined whether high functioning (HF) children
with ASD use abstract category information to the same extent when mak-
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ing categorization as typically developing (TD) children. They presented a
dot pattern categorization task to both TD and HFASD children and an-
alyzed the response patterns with a computational model of categorization
that assumes category knowledge is represented in the form of an abstracted
prototype. On the basis of individual level estimates of the parameters in
the computational model analysis, they compared categorical processing in
HFASD children and matched TD controls. Church et al. found that HFASD
children did not use abstracted category knowledge in the same way when
classifying novel objects as TD children, in that they appeared less sensitive
to differences between stimuli when generalizing.
In this paper, we take the lead from Church et al. (2010) to illustrate the
application of hierarchical Bayesian explanatory cognitive psychometrics. In
particular, we use an item response model that has strong theoretical founda-
tions in cognitive science and was developed to understand the performance
of people in categorization tasks, to assess individual differences in sensi-
tivity to the prototype. Besides charting individual differences, we evaluate
an explanatory component by examining differences at a group level between
known groups, that is, typically developing children and children with Autism
Spectrum Disorder. In our analyses, we rely on Bayesian inference for pa-
rameter estimation, we make use of hierarchical models to capture differences
between the two a priori groups in the study (TD and HFASD children), and
we add a mixture component to accommodate the possibility that some chil-
dren relied on different strategies in the categorization task. We describe all
steps of the Bayesian modelling approach, including parameter estimation
and model comparison, evaluation and expansion.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we provide the necessary
background on the modelling approach, followed by a description of the task,
the data and the model used to assess differences in sensitivity. We then de-
scribe two analyses. In a first analysis, we recast the analysis of Church
et al. (2010) in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. In a second analysis, we
extend the modelling approach by implementing a mixture modeling compo-
nent that isolates children for which the appropriateness of the model can be
questioned. By not taking these children in account when making inferences
about the parameters in the model, the inferences become more valid.
2. Hierarchical Bayesian explanatory cognitive psychometrics
Our approach for studying individual differences relies on information pro-
cessing models with a strong theoretical foundation in the cognitive sciences,
considers explanatory covariates, and uses a hierarchical Bayesian approach
to model evaluation and parameter inference. In this section, we discuss each
of these aspects in more detail.
2.1. Cognitive psychometrics
As a discipline, psychometrics is concerned with the measurement of psy-
chologically interesting aspects of individuals. This involves inferring the
position of individuals on latent variables on the basis of their responses to
a set of questions, stimuli or items. From this definition, it is apparent that
psychometrics is closely related to the study of individual differences. The
early developments culminated in the classical test theory (see, e.g., the refer-
ence work of Lord & Novick, 1968). Although elegantly formulated and still
widely used in practical settings, classical test theory rests on an untestable
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mathematical decomposition (i.e., the “true score” theory) and is therefore
becoming increasingly superseded by item response theory (IRT).
IRT is not a single theory, but rather a large family of general testable
statistical models. All item response models incorporate some theory of what
happens when an item is presented to a person. For many well-known mod-
els, the theoretical foundation is rather shallow: For example, in the Rasch
model, both a person and an item are characterized by a single real number
(generally referred to as ability and difficulty, respectively) and their differ-
ence determines the probability that the person answers the item correctly
(i.e., a simple rule of domination). This corresponds to assuming a single
dimension underlying the task, without any further elaboration on what it
is that constitutes the dimension or which cognitive processes are involved
when doing the task.
The theoretical foundation of an item response model can be considerably
strengthened by considering the psychological processes underlying an indi-
vidual’s responses (e.g., Tuerlinckx & De Boeck, 2005; van der Maas et al.,
2011). Information processing models developed and used in the cognitive
sciences are excellently suitable for this purpose. These models formally de-
scribe the processes underlying behavior in tasks involving thinking, remem-
bering, perceiving, deciding, learning and so on. The application of cognitive
process models as psychometric measurement models has been coined cogni-
tive psychometrics (Batchelder, 1998; Riefer et al., 2002). The central idea
in cognitive psychometrics is to apply sophisticated quantitative models of
cognition to measure specific information processing characteristics, allow-
ing precise and mathematical formulation of hypotheses, and sophisticated
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quantitative tests.
2.2. Explanatory psychometrics
The majority of IRT applications descriptive. Models are used to as-
sess the individual differences, without explaining these differences in terms
that go beyond the ones inscribed by the models’ basic theoretical founda-
tion. In line with the rise of multilevel (hierarchical) models (see Verbeke &
Molenberghs, 2009), the framework of explanatory psychometrics has been
developed. In explanatory item response models (e.g., De Boeck & Wilson,
2004), the individual differences are explained by relating them to external
person variables, such as measures on traits or experimental conditions. The
goal is not only to position individuals on latent variables that are meaning-
ful parameters, but also to relate individual differences and group differences
to potential covariates.
2.3. Hierarchical mixture models
Psychometric modelling has often involved building hierarchical models
(Gelman & Hill, 2006; Kruschke & Vanpaemel, 2015; Lee, 2011; Rouder &
Lu, 2005). A hierarchical model comprises two (or more) levels, each con-
taining parameters that are inferred from observed data. At the lowest level,
an item response model specifies how a person generates a response to an
item on the basis of person-specific parameters. These parameters indicate
the positions of the persons on the dimensions of interest. It is assumed
that the person-specific parameters are drawn from a group distribution at a
higher hierarchical level, defined by a number of group-specific parameters.
The group distribution can be considered a population distribution for the
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person-specific parameters and some of its features — such as the mean and
variability — can be inferred from the data.
Hierarchical models enable researchers to consider population differences
by investigating differences in the group-specific parameters (i.e., explaining
the differences among persons using group membership as a person covari-
ate). In contrast with more traditional approaches such as averaging the data
within a group, or separately analyzing each participant, the hierarchical ap-
proach does not assume that all individuals within a group are identical, nor
does it neglect similarities between individuals of the same population. All
parameters are simultaneously estimated from the observations, capturing
both the differences between individuals and the differences between popu-
lations, holding the middle ground between an approach that allows every
individual to be unique and an approach that only considers population av-
erages. Especially when only few data are available per participant, the
strength of a hierarchical analysis is in partial pooling: The individuals’ esti-
mates within a group are used to infer the population characteristics, which
are simultaneously used to reduce uncertainty in an individual’s estimates.
Inter-individual differences are not restricted to different values of pa-
rameters in a computational model. While such quantitative differences are
often the focus of interest, qualitative differences should also be considered
(e.g., Bartlema et al., 2014). In the context of behavioral data from a cog-
nitive task, it is plausible to assume that there are more than one way to go
about the task. Not all participants rely on the same heuristics, strategies
or cognitive processes when doing the task. Consequently, it is important to
consider alternative strategies in the analysis, because parameter estimates
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are only informative to the extent the model they figure in is appropriate.
By adding mixture components, latent groups can be discovered, that is,
clusters of individuals that appear to use a common strategy.
2.4. Bayesian inference
In hierarchical mixture models, inferences about parameters are typically
done in a Bayesian fashion. Bayesian inference is generally acknowledged
as a complete, coherent and intuitive way of relating data and theory, and
its application in psychological research has taken flight over the last decade
(Lee, 2008, in press). In a Bayesian view, knowledge about parameters is
represented by probability distributions. In the present case, the parameters
map onto relevant aspects of cognitive functioning – sensitivity – and the
probability distribution reflects our knowledge and uncertainty about these
parameters. Before observing any data, our knowledge of a parameter θ
is captured in a prior distribution p(θ), providing a quantification of the
uncertainty about the values the parameter may take. Often, theory or
logic bring expectations about the parameters, and the prior can be used
to reflect this information (Lee & Vanpaemel, submitted; Vanpaemel & Lee,
2012). If there is no prior knowledge available about θ, a broad and non-
committal prior is chosen. When experimental data D become available,
the prior distribution is updated, yielding the posterior distribution p(θ|D)
by applying Bayes’ rule, p(θ|D) = p(D|θ)
p(D)
p(θ). The posterior quantifies the
current knowledge and uncertainty about θ after having taken the data into
account.
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3. Autism and sensitivity to the prototype
Church et al. (2010) collected data in a dot pattern categorization task
(e.g., Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Posner & Keele, 1968) from a group of
HFASD children, and a group of TD children matched on age, gender and
IQ. In a training phase, the children were presented with dot patterns and
informed about which dot patterns were “cave ghosts”. In the test phase,
they were asked to decide for a number of novel dot patterns whether they
were cave ghosts. HFASD children were observed to endorse the category
prototype significantly less and seemed to make less use of similarity to the
prototype in their classification judgments. To examine this further, Church
et al. fitted a prototype model (Nosofsky, 1987) to the observed response
pattern of each participant separately. The prototype model assumes that
during the training phase, abstract knowledge about the category is retained
in the prototype, and that subsequent classification of novel stimuli relies on
this abstracted prototype. Their model analyses revealed that the average
sensitivity to the prototype, as quantified by a parameter in the prototype
model, was substantially smaller for the HFASD children than for the TD
children.
3.1. Categorization Task
3.1.1. Procedure.
The stimuli involved a prototype (P), 40 distortions (L) from the proto-
type varying in level of distortion, and 45 random stimuli (R). Each stimulus
was a dot pattern (see Posner & Keele, 1968) in which the dots were con-
nected by lines. There were five different levels of distortion, denoted as
L2, L3, L4, L5 and L7, with the higher level having less resemblance to the
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prototype. There were five L2, ten L3, five L4, ten L5, and ten L7 stimuli.
All participants completed a training phase comprising 30 trials, in which
five L3, five L5, five L7, and 15 random, non-category member stimuli were
presented. On each trial, participants were asked to indicate whether the
presented stimulus was a “cave ghost” (that is, a category member), after
which corrective feedback was given. During the test phase, five examples
of the prototype and of each of the five distortion types were presented, as
well as 30 random stimuli, totalling 60 trials. All stimuli were presented in a
fixed order and none of the test stimuli were presented in the training phase.
During the test phase, participants did not receive corrective feedback.
3.1.2. Data.
The study by Church et al. (2010) involved 40 children ages 7 to 12 years,
with 20 in each group (HFASD and TD). The two groups were matched on
age, gender and IQ. The inclusion criteria for children in the HFASD group
can be found in Church et al. (2010, p. 864). Figure 1 shows the average data
pattern for both groups, as well as the observed pattern for each individual
subject, in the form of the proportion of endorsement as a cave ghost for
each stimulus type in the test phase. Each participant has been assigned an
identification number that is consistent throughout the manuscript, 1 to 20
for TD children and 21 to 40 for children with HFASD.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows a clear general pattern, both for HFASD
and TD children: Stimuli being more similar to the prototype are more
readily endorsed as category members (cave ghosts). However, looking at
the individual response patterns in the right panel, there are a number of
children that do not seem to follow the general pattern (e.g., participants 3,
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29 and 34). These patterns provide reason to suspect that these children were
using a different strategy when doing the task, which will be an important
motivation for the second analysis.
3.2. Categorization model
Church et al. (2010) used a computational model of category learning,
the multiplicative prototype model (MPM; Nosofsky, 1987; Smith & Minda,
1998), to understand the processes at play in the categorization task. Accord-
ing to the MPM, the probability of assigning a (novel) stimulus to a category
depends on the similarity between the stimulus and the category’s prototype,
which is the average category member. Thus, when presented with members
of a category, it is assumed that learners retain an abstract representation
of that category by averaging across all the members. When then asked to
judge whether a novel object is a category member, the learner evaluates
the similarity of the novel object to the prototype and decides whether it is
sufficiently similar.
Often, stimuli in a categorization task are represented as points in a simi-
larity space, spanned by the physical stimulus dimensions. The psychological
similarity between two stimuli is inversely related to the distance of the cor-
responding points in that space. The prototype is conveniently assumed to
be the average of all category members in the similarity space. A crucial
parameter in the prototype model reflects the sensitivity of participants to
the distances in the similarity space when classifying the stimuli, that is, the
precise shape of the function that maps physical differences (as represented
in the similarity space) to psychological proximity that is used for catego-
rization. The physical distances to the prototype in the similarity space
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are given by the level of distortion from the prototype and can be found in
Church et al. (2010, see appendix).
Formally, the psychological similarity ηj between the prototype and the
jth stimulus (denoted as Sj) is assumed to be an exponentially decaying
function of their physical distance dj to the prototype:
ηj = e
−cdj , (1)
where c is a free parameter reflecting the sensitivity. The probability of
endorsing a stimulus j as a category member is:
p(Ej = 1|Sj) = ηj
ηj + e−q
(2)
where q is a free parameter reflecting the bias towards classifying a stimulus
as a category member. The model used in Church et al. (2010) used p(Ej =
1|Sj) = ηjηj+k , with the free parameter k called the criterion. Our version is
related to their version through re-parametrization as follows: k = e−q.
3.2.1. Interpretation of the parameters
When the aim is to differentiate individuals and groups in terms of param-
eters in a model, it is crucial to have a clear and unambiguous interpretation
of these parameters. In the prototype model, the parameter q can be inter-
preted as the log odds of classifying the prototype stimulus as a prototype.
This follows from considering the prototype as a stimulus in Equation 2. In
this case, the distance dj is zero, the similarity ηj is one, and the probability
to classify the prototype as a category member is:
p(Ej = 1|prototype) = 1
1 + exp(−q) . (3)
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Rewriting Equation 3 yields the desired interpretation of q:
q = log
p(Ej = 1|prototype)
1− p(Ej = 1|prototype) = log
p(Ej = 1|prototype)
p(Ej = 0|prototype) . (4)
If q = 0, the prototype is classified as a category member at chance level
(see Figure 2). If q =∞, this probability equals one, but even more moderate
values of q yield very high classification probabilities. For example, a q of
3 implies a classification probability of 0.95. While q can in principle be
negative, this is theoretically implausible as performance then drops below
guessing.
Of more importance for the present purpose is the parameter c, which
controls how physical and psychological distance are related. In particular,
it reflects how sensitive participants are to the prototype. As illustrated in
Figure 2, when c is large, only stimuli that lie very close to the prototype
have non-negligable classification probabilities; when c is very small, all dis-
tortion levels yield the same classification probabilities, independent of their
distances to the prototype.
4. First Analysis: Hierarchical prototype model
Church et al. (2010) fit the prototype model to each individual’s data
using SSD (sum of squared deviations), and then averaged the children’s pa-
rameter estimates within each group to study group differences. We recast
the computational analysis of Church et al. (2010) in a hierarchical Bayesian
framework, which considers all data simultaneously: On the basis of the
categorization data, we infer the sensitivity to the prototype for each indi-
vidual child separately, and, simultaneously, the group-level sensitivity to the
prototype, separately for HFASD and TD children.
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Figure 2: Classification probability as a function of log odds (q) and sensitivity (c). Log
odds determines the endorsement probability at d = 0. Sensitivity influences the en-
dorsement probability when distance to the prototype increases, with higher sensitivity
resulting in lower endorsement.
By assuming separate population distributions for the HFASD and TD
children, inferences are made separately for each group. However, we do not
assume that all participants within a group have the same sensitivity, nor
do we ignore similarities in sensitivity between participants within groups.
Rather, we acknowledge that children within a group are different, without
ignoring their similarities. The size of the differences between groups is based
on the comparison of the population level distributions of the parameters of
interest.
4.1. Generative model
In the test phase of the categorization task, participants provided classifi-
cation judgments for stimuli of varying similarity to the prototype. The data
take the form of counts — the number of times a child k endorsed stimuli
of a particular noise level j as a category member — which are assumed to
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follow a binomial distribution:
ykj ∼ Binomial(rkj, nj) (5)
where rkj is the response probability and nj is the number of stimuli of
noise level j (j = 1, . . . , 7). We assume the classification decisions follow a
prototype process, which means that the response probability is calculated
on the basis of the psychological distance dj of stimulus j to the prototype
such that
rkj =
e−ckdj
e−ckdj + e−qk
(6)
which follows directly from Equation 2.
The prototype model, with individual subject parameters ck and qk (with
k = 1, . . . , 40) , is extended hierarchically with group-level parameters that
describe the overall sensitivity and log odds of the HFASD and TD children:
(ck, qk) ∼ N (µg,Σg) (7)
characterized by a group-specific mean vector µg = (µgc , µ
g
q) and a by a group
specific 2-by-2 covariance matrix Σg:
Σg =
σg2c σgcq
σgcq σ
g2
q
 . (8)
Depending on group membership (either HFASD or TD), the individual
parameter is drawn from the respective group-specific bivariate normal dis-
tribution. Sensitivity and log odds capture separate aspects of the degree
of learning a category, but can be correlated. The covariance matrix of the
distribution is group specific, in the sense that separate variances and co-
variances are allowed for each group. In addition, the two groups may differ
from one another in their mean vector:
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µg = α + δGk (9)
where Gk indicates group membership of child k, taking on the value 1 if the
child belongs to the HFASD group and 0 otherwise. The vector α = (αc, αq)
is the mean of the TD group (for a child for which Gk = 0). The vector
δ = (δc, δq) reflects the difference in the mean of both parameters between
the HFASD and TD group.
Broad priors are used for the means of the group level parameters:
αc ∼ Uniform(0, 10)
αq ∼ Uniform(0, 10)
δc ∼ N (0, 10)
δq ∼ N (0, 10)
(10)
Group-level variance parameters σc and σq are given uniform priors be-
tween 0 and 10. We do not put a prior directly on the covariance. Instead, we
specify a prior for the correlation parameter. This prior is a scale-location-
transformed Beta(2,2) distribution, such that ρ+1
2
∼ Beta(2, 2).
The generative model exhaustively describes how classification data are
produced. It is conceptually straightforward to reverse the generative process
to infer which parameter values have likely produced the observed data, thus
updating the prior distributions on the parameters to posteriors containing
the updated knowledge about the parameters on the basis of the observed
response patterns.
To check whether choice of prior had any notable influence on the poste-
rior distributions, we conducted sensitivity analyses by using different con-
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stants and distributions for the group-level variances. Whether uniform dis-
tributions (on αc and αq) assumed an upper bound of 10, 20 or 50, results
were essentially identical, as was the case for different specification of vari-
ance in the normal distributions of the difference between HFASD and TD
children (variance of 10, 20, 50). Using gamma priors on the precision in-
stead of uniform priors on the variances also yielded qualitatively identical
results. Results are presented for the priors as specified above.
4.2. Results
The model parameters were estimated in JAGS (Plummer, 2003). We
ran 3 chains of 1,000,000 samples each, with a burn-in of 10,000 samples,
withholding every tenth sample. Each chain was initialized with different
values, drawn from the prior. Effective sample size was larger than 22,000
for all parameters. Convergence was established visually for the group level
parameters and by calculating Rˆ. For all parameters, Rˆ, which is an eval-
uation of the stability of parameter estimates across different chains on the
basis of within chain and between chain variability (Brooks & Gelman, 1997)
was smaller than 1.001.
Figure 3 shows the joint posterior means for ck and qk at the participants’
level (left graph) and the participants’ posterior means of the main parameter
of interest, the sensitivity parameter ck with the 95% highest density interval
(right graph), broken up by group membership. Clearly, there is a strong
correlation between sensitivity and log odds across participants. Further,
two clusters of participants emerge: One cluster includes participants with
very low estimated values of both sensitivity and log odds, while a second
cluster comprises participants with higher estimates on these parameters.
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Figure 3: Joint posterior subject means for sensitivity c and logodds q for the two groups
(left) and posterior means and 95% highest density intervals for c (right).
All but one TD child (participant 3) are in the high estimates cluster. The
HFASD participants, in contrast, are about equally spread out across both
clusters. The picture of a relatively homogenous set of estimates for the
TD group (with the exception of particpant 3) and at least two groups of
estimates in the HFASD group is confirmed when zooming in on sensitivity
(Figure 3, right graph).
The left graph in Figure 4 presents the joint and marginal posterior distri-
bution of the group-level means. The marginal posterior distributions reveal
a substantial difference between groups for both parameters. HFASD chil-
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dren appear to be lower in both log odds of classifying the prototype as a
category member, as well as in sensitivity to differences in the stimulus space.
Zooming in on sensitivity, the posterior distribution on δc, which quantifies
the difference between TD children and HFASD children on the sensitivity
parameter, supports this conclusion. The mean difference is estimated to be
−1.47, with a 95% highest density interval of [−2.26;−0.68].
A formal test of the difference can be performed by calculating a Bayes
factor that compares two models: a model that allows a difference between
TD and HFASD children in the sensitivity parameter (δc 6= 0), and a model
that assumes there is no difference (δc = 0). Applying the Savage-Dickey
procedure (Wagenmakers et al., 2010) to δc we found a Bayes factor > 70
in favor of the difference model. A sensitivity analysis revealed that the
Bayes factor decreased when broadening the priors, but remained in favor of
a difference even in the broadest settings (BF = 28 when δc ∼ N (0, 50)).
4.3. Discussion
Our first analysis is very similar to the analysis by Church et al. (2010).
Like our analysis, their analysis revealed lower sensitivity parameter esti-
mates for the HFASD group (a difference of 0.97, see their Table 2). HFASD
children seem to resolve distances from the prototype less sensitively than
TD children.
An important difference with the analysis of Church et al. (2010) is the
Bayesian hierarchical approach taken here. Our analysis produces a posterior
distribution of the difference between the HFASD and TD population means
for the sensitivity and log odds parameter. Instead of only having individu-
als’ parameters, or only parameter estimates on the basis of averaged data
20
po
st
er
io
r
l
0
2
4
6
8
0 1 2 3 4
group sensitivity (µcg)
gr
ou
p 
lo
g 
od
ds
 (µ
qg )
HFASD
TD
posterior
HDI
−3 −2 −1 0
δc
Figure 4: The left panel shows the joint and marginal posteriors of the group level mean
parameters for TD and HFASD children. The right graph shows the posterior on δc,
indicating the difference between the group level sensitivity parameter for HFASD and
TD, and the 95% highest density interval.
per group, the Bayesian hierarchical analysis simultaneously yields both, al-
lowing differences between children within a group (see Figure 3) as well
as acknowledging the commonality of children of in a particular group (see
Figure 4). Both levels inform each other in the inference process.
Before interpreting parameter estimates, it is necessary to make sure the
model is appropriate for the data. In our case, there are reasons to suspect
that the prototype model is not appropriate for all participants. In particular,
we have already highlighted that some response profiles in Figure 1 (e.g.,
participants 3 and 37) do not reflect the generalization gradient that most
children display, and that one expects to see (that is, generally decreasing
endorsement as stimulus noise levels increase). These children appear to be
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responding at chance level, guessing independent of stimulus noise level. As
shown in Figure 3, they also form the clusters with low estimates for both
parameter c and q.
In sum, there appear to be (at least) two subgroups of HFASD children
and one subgroup may not rely on prototype processes, with their responses
hovering around chance level. Importantly, the validity of any parameter
inference requires the model to be valid to a reasonable extent: The data
of participants who did not follow a prototype strategy, should not be used
when estimating prototype model parameters.
5. Second Analysis: Hierarchical mixture prototype model
If a number of participants were not relying on a prototype strategy,
but guessed on each trial, the population level parameter estimates are a
mixture of parameter values of prototype classifiers and guessers. To isolate
those participants for which the prototype model is not appropriate, we will
compare the prototype model, as specified by Equations 1 and 2, to a simple
guessing model, which assumes a probability of endorsement of 0.5 for each
stimulus type, irrespective of its relation to the prototype. If the data of a
participant are better captured by the guessing model than by the prototype
model, we take this as evidence that the prototype model is not appropriate
for that participant, and that the estimates of the sensitivity parameter are
useless for the participant.
In particular, we assume two clusters: a prototype cluster comprising
children that relied on a prototype process and a guessing cluster compris-
ing children that appear to be guessing (Bartlema et al., 2014; Zeigenfuse
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& Lee, 2010). The cluster assignments are latent, which means that partic-
ipants are assigned to a cluster by the model and not on the basis of some
observed value. As we are interested in differences between TD and HFASD
children in the prototype parameters, we assume there are two subgroups in
the prototype cluster: TD and HFASD children.
5.1. Generative model
Formally, we again assume that the data follow a binomial distribution
with an endorsement probability rkj, of participant k of a stimulus of noise
level j. However, different from the previous analysis, rkj either depends on
a guessing strategy or on a prototype model process:
rkj = zk
1
2
+ (1− zk)
(
e−ckdj
e−ckdj + e−qk
)
(11)
with zk indicating whether participant k follows a guessing strategy or a
prototype strategy.
The probability with which a participant is relying on a guessing strategy
is controlled by a Bernouilli process with a separate, group-specific rate θg,
with g indicating group membership (TD or HFASD):
zk ∼ Bernouilli(θg) (12)
with a noncommittal prior on the parameters θg ∼ Beta(1, 1). If a partici-
pant is assigned to the guessing cluster (zk = 1), all classification judgments
are made with a response rate of .5. If a participant is assigned to the pro-
totype cluster (zk = 0), classification judgments follow the prototype model
described earlier. Reversing the flow of the generative model, we can infer
whether a participant followed a guessing or prototype strategy (the posterior
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probability of zk) on the basis of her response pattern, simultaneously estab-
lishing the probability (θg) that HFASD children and TD children resorted
to guessing.
To check whether choice of prior had any notable influence on the resulting
posterior distribution, priors were varied as in the first analysis, yielding
qualitatively identical results. Results are presented for the priors above.
5.2. Results
We ran 3 chains of 1,000,000 samples each, with a burn-in of 10,000
samples, keeping every tenth sample. Each chain was initialized with different
parameter values, randomly drawn from the priors. Effective sample size was
larger than 25,000 for all parameters. Convergence was established visually
for the group level parameters and the Rˆ measure for all parameters was
smaller than 1.01.
Figure 5 shows the latent assignment of participants, indicated by the
mean of a binary latent group indicator (zk), and the posterior of being
assigned to the guessing strategy (θg). The right panel shows that the prob-
ability of resorting to a guessing strategy is larger for HFASD children (mean
posterior probability of .41, with 95% highest density interval [0; 0.21]) than
for TD children (.09, [0.20; 0.63]).
At the individual level, for all but one participant (participant 34 from the
HFASD group), assignments are very outspoken. Eight children with HFASD
and one TD child (participant 3) are better accounted for by a simple guess-
ing model than by the prototype model. For these children, the prototype
model is clearly not the most appropriate model. This observation has se-
vere implications for the research question on sensitivity differences between
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Figure 5: Latent assignment to the guessing group (left graph). The right graph shows
the posterior on θ (probability of being assigned to the guessing strategy) for each group.
The bars under the graph represent the 95% highest density interval for both groups.
HFASD and TD children: The data of the children for which the prototype
model is not appropriate should not inform the population parameter esti-
mates of sensitivity and log odds. Results are more uncertain for participant
34, who is included in the prototype group in approximately 40% of the pos-
terior samples, thus influencing inference on higher level distributions only
in those samples. In the following graphs, we assign participant 34 to the
guessing group, as the posterior probability indicates it is uncertain whether
he or she was following a prototype strategy.
Focusing on the participants for which the prototype model was appro-
priate, or at least more appropriate than a simple guessing model, Figure 6
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presents the joint posterior means for sensitivity and log odds. The chil-
dren with extremely low ck and qk values in Figure 3 are no longer depicted,
as they are now assigned to the guessing cluster. Apparently, our simple
guessing model was able to capture their data profiles better than the pro-
totype model. These participants will no longer influence the population
level parameter estimates (or only marginally so, depending on the posterior
probability of being assigned to the guessing group).
Taking a further look at group level posterior distributions (Figure 7), it
is clear that the marginal distributions of the population means (µgc and µ
g
q)
overlap more than in the first analyses. In other words, HFASD and TD chil-
dren are not as easily differentiated with respect to sensitivity and log odds.
Zooming in on sensitivity, the posterior mean for the difference between the
two groups is −.68, with the 95% highest density interval being [−1.49; 0.07]
, Comparison of a model without difference in sensitivity between TD and
HFASD and the model with — relying on the Savage-Dickey procedure on
the basis of δc — yielded a Bayes Factor of 1.6 in favor of the model assuming
there is no difference (i.e., δc = 0). As expected, the Bayes factor slightly
increased with broader priors, to 3.6 when δc ∼ N (0, 50). While providing
weak support for the absence of a difference in sensitivity between TD and
HFASD, the Bayes factor mainly indicates that the data are not sufficiently
informative to decide between the two models.
5.3. Discussion
To get a sense of the extent to which the model can account for the data,
Figure 8 presents the group level and individual level posterior predictive,
together with the observed data. A posterior predictive check is a Bayesian
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method for assessing the fit of a model to data, based on simulating data
from the posterior predictive distribution and comparing these simulations to
the observed data (Gelman & Hill, 2006; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Shiffrin
et al., 2008). As can be seen from the left panel, the guessing group comprises
the participants that were most erratic in their categorization responses,
reflecting little evidence for the generalization gradient one would expect in
a classification task. The data patterns of the prototype groups, TD and
HFASD children, seem more homogeneous, and do reflect the generalization
gradient. Not surprisingly, the differences in the parameter posteriors have
decreased. By isolating the guessers, the response patterns are also consistent
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with the analysis’ assumption of homogeneous groups.
The guessing model is extremely simple, without any free parameters,
which gives it an advantage in model comparisons with the prototype model
that has more flexibility with two free parameters (Myung, 2000). Yet, re-
sponse patterns that reflect the general decrease in endorsement as a function
of similarity are unambiguously assigned to the prototype model. Thus, de-
spite its higher complexity, the prototype model compares favorably to the
simple guessing model in these cases. Also, latent assignments of children
were robust against different prior settings in the sensitivity analysis, even
with the most diffuse priors for the prototype model.
Our analysis reveals two types within the HFASD group: One group
whose behavior can be parsimoniously captured by assuming they are simply
guessing, and one group whose behavior relies on abstraction of a prototype
when learning about the category, and their classification judgments derive
from similarity to the abstracted prototype. For the children assigned to the
guessing group, the prototype model is not appropriate and, consequently,
parameter estimation using that model does not make sense. This has the
epistemological implication that for these children, we are unable to assess
the sensitivity to the prototype. For the children assigned to the prototype
group, assessing the sensitivity to the prototype is possible. On the basis
of their data alone, the difference in sensitivity between TD and HFASD
children is not as outspoken. At the very least, care should be taken when
inferring anything substantial regarding differences between HAFSD and TD
children in sensitivity to the prototype when classifying.
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6. General Discussion
In this paper, we presented a case study of hierarchical Bayesian ex-
planatory cognitive psychometrics. We demonstrated how well-studied lab
paradigms from cognitive science, in tandem with cognitive models and
Bayesian hierarchical mixture methods, can be used to assess individual dif-
ferences and relate them to covariates such as ASD. Our analysis combined
different elements from a traditional IRT analysis (see e.g., De Boeck & Wil-
son, 2004). A statistical model was used to describe the response process.
Individual differences were modeled using a hierarchical population distribu-
tion. Manifest (i.e., group assignment: HFASD vs. TD) and latent covariates
(guessing vs. non-guessing) were used to explain the individual differences.
The major difference is that the response process model was not a generic
IRT model, but rather a computational model deeply rooted in cognitive
theory: the prototype model.
The parameters in the prototype model reflect information processing
characteristics that are theoretically related to ASD. To evaluate whether
these characteristics are different for HFASD children, we assumed that they
were drawn two different population distributions: one for HFASD children
and one for TD children. In a first analysis, we found a difference in sensitiv-
ity to the prototype, with HFASD children being less sensitive. However, in
a second analysis, we added a mixture component to isolate children that did
not seem to rely on prototype processes. When focusing only on participants
for which a prototype model seemed appropriate, the difference in sensitivity
between HFASD and TD children largely disappeared, which is in line with
recent evidence suggesting that HFASD children that extract a prototype are
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near-identical in sensitivity to TD children (Church et al., 2015). Yet, the
Bayes factor testing for a difference primarily indicated that the present data
are not sufficiently informative to decide either way.
So why did we find evidence in favor of a difference in our first analysis?
This can for a large part be attributed to the presence of a subgroup of
participants who seemed to have been guessing. The prototype model can
capture the response profiles of these participants to a certain extent, by
setting the sensitivity and log odds parameters close to zero. With near-zero
sensitivity and log odds, response probabilities are close to .5, independent
of the similarity of the stimulus to the prototype. Because the guessers were
not isolated in the first analysis, and the guessing strategy was substantially
more frequent in the HFASD group, their group-level sensitivity and log
odds were substantially lowered. In the second analysis, we identified the
guessers, and they were not used to infer the inference about the prototype
model’s parameters. As a result, the difference in sensitivity was no longer
convincing.
It may be disappointing that we are not able to provide more definite an-
swers to the questions formulated by Church et al. (2010). However, the in-
ferences made here are the best we can possibly make at this point. Stronger
conclusions would be misleading. We consider it a strength of the Bayesian
hierarchical mixture approach that it heeds us from overly strong conclu-
sions. That is not to say that stronger inferences are impossible: Increasing
the strength of either the theory side — by making stronger assumptions re-
garding processes, subgroups, etc... — or the empirical side — by gathering
more data, or by, for example, building a more elaborate stimulus space —
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might lead to stronger conclusions.
6.1. Interpretation of the guessing group
The existence of different subgroups within the HFASD population should
not come as a surprise (see, e.g., Caron et al., 2006; Church et al., 2015;
Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007) and corroborates earlier evidence of multiple
response patterns in these data (Dovgopoly & Mercado III, 2013). In our
second analysis, about half of the HFASD children were assigned to a guessing
group rather than the prototype group. This is not to say that we are sure
that these children were in fact guessing. It simply means that a simple
model with no free parameters, setting all response probabilities at 0.5, can
accommodate the data at least equally well as the substantially more complex
prototype model. In this light, it is unwise to use the prototype model to
understand their behavior.
It has been argued that social and non-social symptoms that are gener-
ally associated with ASD are not necessarily inherently linked and may have
very different causes at the genetic, neural and cognitive level (the fraction-
able autism triad hypothesis, see, e.g., Brunsdon & Happe´, 2014; Happe´
& Ronald, 2008). Even within the cognitive domain, symptoms related to
executive functioning on the one hand and focus on detail and the difficulty
to integrate information on the other may not be caused by the same under-
lying principles (see e.g., Best et al., 2008; Happe´ & Booth, 2008; Lawson
et al., 2004). The present findings are consistent with this hypothesis, as
different subgroups were clearly identified in the classification behavior. Un-
fortunately the interpretation of the subgroups is not straightforward, as the
guessing patterns can have a variety of causes, ranging from impaired as-
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signment of cognitive resources (an executive function) to prototype related
processes such as the extent to which a sensible prototype is abstracted in
the learning phase, and the extent to which the distances in the psychological
space are stretched or shrunk as controlled by the sensitivity parameter.
6.2. Sensitivity and hyperspecifity
A crucial step in cognitive psychometrics is determining what the pa-
rameter estimates mean from a theoretical perspective. Unfortunately, the
relationship between the sensitivity parameter, as build in the prototype
model, and current theories on ASD is not as clear as one would hope. From
the perspective of enhanced perceptual functioning of individuals with ASD
(e.g., Mottron et al., 2006) one expects the formation of highly specific and
detailed representations. The exact modelling translation of hyperspecificity,
however, is unclear. One translation implies the formation of exemplar based
representations rather than prototype representations (Medin & Schaffer,
1978). In this scenario, one expects a lower sensitivity to the prototype for
HFASD than for TD controls — one can not be sensitive to what has not
been formed (although as mentioned above, applying the prototype model
when assuming no prototype has been formed is highly questionable). This
seems to be the reasoning used in Church et al. (2010). Another translation
could be that prototypes can be formed. In that case, one expects larger sen-
sitivity values for the HFASD participants: Larger sensitivity values stretch
the stimulus space, exaggerating differences, leading to the detailed, piece-
meal representations following from enhanced perceptual functioning (see
Bott et al., 2006).
Clearly, the application of the computational prototype model forces re-
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searchers, and rightfully so, to be very explicit regarding which aspect is
expected to be different in individuals with ASD. In light of this, it should
be a key concern in further studies of categorization performance of indi-
viduals with ASD, to develop stimuli, category structures and designs that
allow differentiation of the prototype formation and sensitivity, given their
apparent importance in theories regarding ASD.
6.3. Conclusion
We have illustrated how Bayesian hierarchical mixture models can be
usefully applied in explanatory cognitive psychometrics. The goal in this
approach is to use cognitive models to produce estimates of psychologically
interesting parameters regarding cognitive functioning, and to relate them to
external co-variates. By re-analysis of data collected by Church et al. (2010)
on categorization in children with HFASD, we have demonstrated that this
approach can lead to nuanced answers to the questions at hand and provides
information on uncertainty regarding these answers. Throughout, we have
highlighted the importance of establishing the appropriateness of the model
before taking the parameter estimates seriously. The resulting answers can
be considered the best possible answers, given the question at hand, the level
of theoretical development and the data collected.
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